'You Must Be as Clever as We Think You': Assessing Intelligence in Henry James's The Tragic Muse by Lyons, Sara
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Lyons, Sara  (2017) 'You Must Be as Clever as We Think You': Assessing Intelligence in Henry
James's The Tragic Muse.   Modern Philology, 115  (1).   pp. 105-130.  ISSN 0026-8232.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/691594






"'You Must be as Clever as We Think You': Assessing Intelligence in 
Henry James's A Tragic Muse"  
Word count: 9961; 11,563 (including endnotes) 
 
In his 1913 autobiography, A Small Boy and Others, Henry James recalls how 
being bad at maths at school convinced him that he was stupid:  
 
I recall strange neighbours and deskfellows who, not otherwise too 
objectionable, were uncanny and monstrous through their possession, 
cultivation, imitation of ledgers, daybooks, double-entry, tall pages of 
figures, interspaces streaked with oblique ruled lines that weirdly 
"balanced," whatever that might mean, and other like horrors. Nothing in 
truth is more distinct to me than the tune to which they were, without 
exception, at their ease on such ground — unless it be my general dazzled, 
humiliated sense, through those years, of the common, the baffling, 
mastery, all round me [...] Everyone did things and had things — everyone 
knew how, [...], just as they kept in their heads such secrets for how to do 
sums [...] Those who surrounded me were all agog, to my vision, with the 
benefit of their knowledge. I see them, in this light, across the years, fairly 
grin and grimace with it; and the presumable vulgarity of some of them, 
certain scattered shades of baseness still discernible, comes to me as but 
one of the appearances of an abounding play of genius. Who was it I ever 
thought stupid? [...] All of which, I should add, didn't in the least prevent 
my moving on the plane of the remarkable [...]; I was fairly gorged with 
wonders. [...] It was strange [that I was] so stupid without being more 
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brutish and so perceptive without being more keen.1  
 
It is easy to read this passage suspiciously. James's incapacity for 
calculation turns out to be a mark of election, a sign of a Romantic appetite for 
wonder that augurs his vocation as an artist. Where his classmates were 
presumably fit for a world of "ledgers, daybooks, double-entry", of doing things 
and having things, he was a beautiful soul. James reassures us that his type of 
incapacity had no negative class connotations — he was in no way "vulgar", 
"brutish", or "base" — and goes on to suggest that it was in fact so discreet that it 
escaped the attention of his teachers (129). More subtly, the passage encourages 
us to recognize that if the twelve-year old James was hopeless at maths, it was 
because he was a precocious philosopher; while his classmates calculated, he 
pondered the incalculability of other minds. But James's forms of self-
aggrandizement here only reward so much suspicion: they are relatively overt, 
and predictable enough. Writing at the end of a long and distinguished career, 
James takes it for granted that the reader of his autobiography credits him with 
exceptional mental powers. More interesting is James's effort to convey that his 
celebrated perceptiveness had its origins in a hyperbolic childhood conviction of 
his stupidity. An acute sense of mental inferiority engenders a paranoid but also 
creative fascination with other people: it makes all other minds seem a store of 
troubling secrets, enviable knowledge, even when they are engaged in something 
as dull as schoolwork. James suggests that if his schoolboy self possessed any 
latent genius, it was because he "never thought anyone stupid". 
 As Mark McGurl has observed, the critical tendency to focus on the 
epistemological dramas staged so obsessively by James's late fiction — who 
knows what, how they know it, and the value of their knowledge — has tended to 
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obscure the extent to which James is interested in the evaluation of intelligence.2 
James's characters are typically preoccupied not just with the question of how 
and what other people know but how well they know; they are generally anxious 
to discover not just the contents but the calibre of other minds. For McGurl, this 
is because James is the master of the modernist art of making invidious 
distinctions: his formidably difficult late novels aspire to serve as an esoteric 
type of I.Q. test, sifting the "intelligent from the stupid" at the level of both 
character and readership (75). In McGurl's account, James's desire to adjudicate 
on the question of intelligence is his queasy reaction to a perceived blurring of 
social distinctions in the late nineteenth century; his anxieties about mass 
culture and social leveling inspire him to refigure and mystify volatile class 
distinctions as intellectual distinctions (65).  
  Tellingly, however, McGurl's account dwells much more on the 
intimidating effects of James's representational strategies upon the reader than 
upon how intelligence is represented through particular characters and 
conceptualized within James's fictional worlds. His claim that James is invested 
in "distinguishing the stupid from the smart" appears as part of a brief 
discussion of James's 1896 novella, The Spoils of Poynton. McGurl suggests that 
this work illustrates James's tendency to equip certain characters with quasi-
authorial insight — the characters James calls his "centres of intelligence" — and 
to distinguish them from flat, dull-witted characters denied such authorial 
preferment (75). Yet despite and sometimes because of this kind of authorial 
favoritism, it is extremely difficult to determine who passes for intelligent in 
James's fiction; rather than establishing a clear hierarchy of intellect with its 
own formal difficulties at the apex, he makes the vexed nature of judgments 
about intelligence one of the cardinal difficulties of reading his work. Take for 
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example this brief passage from The Spoils of Poynton: 
            
[Mrs. Gereth] had no imagination about anybody's life save on the side she 
bumped against. Fleda was quite aware that she would have otherwise 
been a rare creature; but a rare creature was originally just what she had 
struck her as being. Mrs. Gereth had really no perception of anybody's 
nature — had only one question about persons: were they clever or stupid? 
To be clever meant to know the marks.3 
  
It is true that Fleda seems to be granted an authorial quasi-omniscience 
here. She is apparently so sensitive, so anxious to do imaginative justice to 
others, that she manages to take into account not just Mrs. Gereth's actually-
existing complexities, but, circularly, the kinds of complexities Mrs. Gereth 
might have possessed had she exercised the same kind of moral imagination. 
Crucially, Mrs. Gereth's preoccupation with the question of whether other 
people are clever or stupid is not only a moral but an intellectual limitation, 
depriving her of the apparently more enlightened perspective of Fleda; James 
implies that to ask "is this person clever or stupid?" is to ask a stupid question, 
at least if it is your primary question. "Marks" here perhaps carries the 
connotation of a student's test results — a meaning the word acquired in the 
early nineteenth century (OED) — but the primary reference is to 
manufacturer's marks: the phrase underscores Mrs. Gereth's tendency to assess 
other people as if they were furniture and had a value determinable by aesthetic 
connoisseurship. The novella centres on Mrs. Gereth's obsession with her 
family's antique furniture — the "spoils" of the title — and her low opinion of the 
intelligence of her son, Owen, whom she fears will marry a "stupid" girl (111), 
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Mona Brigstock. Although James does not falsify Mrs. Gereth's estimate of her 
son in an obvious way — that is, by revealing that he has unsuspected depths of 
intelligence — he uses Fleda to underscore that Mrs. Gereth's intelligence index 
is itself stupid, a self-ratifying epistemological circle. As Fleda observes, Mrs. 
Gereth thinks the meaning of other people is exhausted by whatever obtrusive 
part of them her imagination happens to "bump" against; and as the phrase 
implies, her imagination mostly bumps against the question of material 
possessions. However, Fleda's assessment of Mrs Gereth's intelligence mirrors 
rather than transcends Mrs Gereth's presumption of intellectual sovereignty; 
rather than simply bestowing authorial omniscience on Fleda, James ironizes 
Fleda's aspiration toward it. Like Mrs Gereth, Fleda flatters herself that she 
"knows the marks of cleverness", and fetishizes Owen's "beautiful dense[ness]" 
as if his mental capacity were as palpably material as an item of furniture: she 
desires him precisely because she thinks him a "blockhead" (186), and would 
like to "contribute all the cleverness" to a marriage (40). 
 Pursuing this line of interpretation seems to lead to the conclusion that 
Fleda's and Mrs. Gereth's "cleverness" is an immoral exercise of social power, 
and that Owen is the victim of their "reifying aestheticism", to borrow Jonathan 
Freedman's phrase.4 However, there is no simple equation between "cleverness" 
and social power in The Spoils of Poynton. The novella as a whole can be read 
either as a satire on or a tragedy about the way two women draw upon 
discourses of aesthetics to construct a compensatory fiction of their "superior 
acuteness" (125), one that enables them to conceal from themselves their 
abjection in relation to patriarchy. The plot turns on Mrs. Gereth's elaborate 
efforts to outwit the custom of primogeniture, by which she stands to be 
dispossessed of her house and furniture collection as soon as her son marries. 
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Throughout, Owen's alleged "stupidity" can be read as a sign not of his 
victimhood but of his complacent power. In effect, patriarchal custom does his 
thinking for him and spares him what appears to be the exhausting, feminized 
labor of "cleverness" in this novella; he can afford to be ignorant of the women's 
baroque mental lives. 
Thus far I have been echoing the novella's brutal binary of "clever" versus 
"stupid". This binary is in fact pervasive in James's writing, and is operative 
from the start: it is discernible in his first novel, Roderick Hudson (1875).5 
James's characters often favor the word "clever" to "intelligent" or any other 
synonym for mental ability; and the concomitant ubiquity of the word "stupid" 
in his fiction tends to conjure a terrifying social world regulated by a stark 
distinction between cleverness and stupidity. On face of it, this is surprising; 
why does James, celebrated for his attentiveness to the nuances of 
consciousness and of social life, revert to such a crude, even childish vocabulary 
when capturing people's intellectual worth? Put another way, why does he 
persistently construct characters who, though often defined by their sensitivity 
and sophistication, have such an impoverished vocabulary for assessing the 
intelligence of others?  These observations seem to support McGurl's argument 
that James sought to make the novel form the arbiter of a new kind of 
intellectual hierarchy. Yet this essay argues, at least in relation to James's 1890 
novel, The Tragic Muse, that just the opposite is the case. In this comedy of 
English manners and of the theatre, the clever/stupid binary is invoked and 
worried over so incessantly by the characters that the terms acquire a dizzying 
range of implications and a deconstructive force. James's somewhat 
claustrophobic focus upon the meanings of "cleverness" in upper-class English 
life in The Tragic Muse enables him to unravel the contradictions and 
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anachronisms embedded in apparently modern conceptions of intelligence, 
professionalism, and merit.6 In particular, the novel's comedy persistently 
exposes the problematic aspects of the modern impetus to reify "intelligence" as 
a unitary, measureable phenomenon.  
The rapid and controversial rise of intelligence testing in both Britain and 
America in the first decades of the twentieth century was the culmination of a 
more protean nineteenth century drive to establish the mainly innate and 
measurable nature of mental ability.7 This same impetus was central to the 
pseudo-sciences of phrenology, physiognomy, and craniometry that had 
flourished in both Britain and America; ; and from the mid-1860s, it gained 
fresh momentum from the work of Francis Galton.8 Galton's efforts to 
demonstrate the fundamentally heritable nature of intelligence through a 
mixture of statistics and biographical case studies first reached the public in the 
form of an essay, "Hereditary Talent and Character" in 1865, and were later 
elaborated in his book Hereditary Genius (1869), which galvanized debate in 
the popular press.9 Galton's theories of intelligence also received considerable 
publicity when his Anthropometric Laboratory was established first at the Royal 
Horticultural Society in South Kensington for the International Health 
Exhibition in May 1884 and then at the Science Galleries of the South 
Kensington Museum in 1888. Galton believed that sensory responses were a 
meaningful index of intelligence, and for this reason, the physiological tests he 
conducted upon thousands of people in his laboratories — between 1885 and 
1889, he gathered data on nearly 20,000 individuals — may be regarded as the 
birth of the transatlantic mental testing movement.10 However, as Jennifer Ruth 
and Cathy Shuman have demonstrated in relation to Britain, the notion that 
examinations can disclose the truth of an individual's intelligence rose to 
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cultural prominence in the mid nineteenth century, and was entangled with the 
development of ideals of professionalism and meritocratic social mobility in the 
period.11 As Shuman writes, "the mid-Victorian culture of testing helped to 
establish the flexible and powerful idea of an unspecific 'ability' or 'talent', from 
the first associated with aristocratic privilege, which was eventually to become 
'intelligence'".12 In what follows, I read The Tragic Muse as an intervention in 
the late nineteenth century reification of intelligence as a mainly innate, unitary, 
and testable phenomenon — in other words, in the nineteenth century genealogy 
of the concept of I.Q.  
 
I. Acting Clever 
 
Being called "clever" can sound like a backhanded compliment. This is firstly 
because, like most terms associated with the intellect, it can have a negative 
moral valence, and James's fiction often puts into play the traditional, Christian 
identifications of cleverness with corruption and ignorance with grace. Such 
identifications are ambiguously present in the Spoils of Poynton, for instance: 
Owen can be read as of one James's holy fools; both Mrs. Gereth and Fleda can 
be understood as "monster[s] of cleverness", to borrow Fleda's own phrase (111). 
As Matthew Sussman has recently argued, James's late fiction often spiritualizes 
"stupidity" in quasi-Christian terms, constructing it as a "palpable attitude 
toward experience, a positive expression of moral purity associated with self- or 
other-protecting ignorance".13 Although the sacred ignorance theme is crucial to 
how James problematizes the modern investment in evaluating "intelligence" in 
his late fiction, this essay will focus on another, more secular reason why 
"clever" can sound like a slight. "Cleverness" implies skillfulness — 
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etymologically, it means to be nimble or dexterous with claws or hands, expert at 
seizing things (OED) — and so to call someone "clever" without specifying what 
the person is clever at can have the effect of implying that his or her whole being 
is defined by or limited to his or her mastery of a particular skill or stratagem. At 
the very least, the adjective prompts the question: clever how? Applied to a 
person, the term elides distinctions between mental and physical acts, being and 
doing: how it is possible simply to be clever, abstracted from any particular skill 
or activity? 
The perplexing and perhaps insidious effects of being judged "clever" are 
central to The Tragic Muse. As Richard Salmon has noted, this novel is the last 
in the series of long, panoramic, realist-naturalist novels that James wrote 
during the 1880s; it may be understood as the culmination of the 'middle phase' 
of his career.14 It has attracted scant critical attention, and primarily as a means 
of gauging James's ambivalent response to the aesthetic movement, especially to 
Oscar Wilde.15 Yet as Freedman has remarked, this novel is James's "most 
thorough treatment of the problem of vocation".16 It is essentially two 
bildungsromane braided together. Both of these vocation narratives focus upon 
the confusions that attend trying to "tak[e] the measure of aptitude", to borrow a 
phrase from the novel itself.17 One is the story of Nick Dormer, the second son of 
an aristocratic family expected to follow his father into a career as a Liberal 
member of parliament. He is, however, more attracted to the idea of being a 
portrait painter, and for much of the novel, he agonizes over whether he has 
sufficient talent to justify abandoning politics for the sake of art. The other is the 
story of Miriam Rooth, an aspiring actress who lives in genteel poverty with her 
mother. Miriam is apparently less conflicted in her ambition than Nick but 
unlike him must overcome other people's scepticism about her talent. Miriam is 
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only apparently less conflicted since, although she is the heroine of the novel, 
James never grants us access to her interior life. He here experiments with a 
strategy he uses much more extensively in The Awkward Age (1899): in James's 
own, somewhat disconcerting theatrical metaphor in his 1908 Preface to the 
novel, he declines to "go behind" Miriam, so we can only judge her by her words 
and actions, and by the impressions she makes on others ("Preface", 9). This 
enables James to pose the question "how does a person tell if he or she has 
talent?" in two obviously incommensurable ways: in the case of Nick, it is 
experienced primarily as an existential riddle, one that he attempts to solve 
mostly in private and by introspection; in the case of Miriam, it is presented as a 
matter of public performance and social judgment. Miriam's narrative concerns 
her effort to convince an audience of her talent; Nick's concerns his effort to 
convince himself of his. The juxtaposed vocation narratives enable James to 
raise a range of questions about the validity of aesthetic judgments; the 
distinctions between art forms; the relationship between public and private life; 
and the value of success in the marketplace. Crucially, however, talent is not a 
vexed question in the novel because the characters or the narrator treat it as an 
ineffable mystery. Although Romantic ideas about genius, imagination, and 
inspiration vaguely haunt the characters, artistic talent is persistently framed in 
terms of a much more worldly, and categorical discourse, shared by all the major 
characters, of cleverness versus stupidity.18 While many of the characters clearly 
wish to give this discourse an absolute, essentialist force, the novel does not 
naturalize it; on the contrary, James continually calls attention to its jarring 
effects, and its tendency to proliferate contradictory meanings. 
Miriam's alleged stupidity registers in part as a conventional prejudice 
against the theatre in general and against actresses in particular — prejudices 
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that James's novel aims to interrogate. The idea that Miriam is stupid is first put 
into circulation by Gabriel Nash, an elusive trickster-aesthete figure generally 
acknowledged to be modeled on Oscar Wilde, though his avowed philosophical 
positions are in some respects closer to Walter Pater's than to Wilde's.19 Nash 
asserts that Miriam has no acting talent because she is "splendidly stupid", and 
then challenges the other characters to "judge" her stupidity for themselves (49). 
Like Wilde, Nash is given to at once dogmatic and paradoxical pronouncements, 
and his verdict on Miriam is actually unstable, blending contempt with aesthetic 
appreciation; it incites other characters to become invested in the question of 
Miriam's intelligence, rather than to dismiss her out of hand. Nash does not 
deign to justify his logic explicitly, but to the extent that it is manifest, it is 
obviously idiosyncratic: he seems to think Miriam is "stupid" because she is an 
aspiring actress rather than an established one. And indeed, it becomes clear 
that Nash despises professional ambition as such. As Richard Salmon has noted 
in relation to The Tragic Muse, nineteenth-century aestheticism as developed by 
Pater and Wilde centred on a polemical, and quasi-aristocratic, valorization of 
being over doing; for instance, Pater claimed that "the end of life is not action 
but contemplation — being as distinct from doing — a certain disposition of 
mind".20 Nash considers Miriam's professional ambition stupid because it 
necessarily defers her desired identity to an uncertain future date and condemns 
her in the meantime to an undignified, subjunctive labor: trying to be. For 
instance, he sneers at the fact that she has adopted a stage name prior to having 
established herself as an actress: "[she] desires to be known by some nom de 
guerre before she has even been able to enlist" (49). Nash's aristocratic logic, or 
illogic — Miriam lacks the talent to be an actress because she is not a successful 
actress already; to aspire is to have failed in advance  — captures a paradox of 
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professional identity that the novel is concerned to probe. As Ruth has argued, 
the Victorian novel often explores the confused temporality of professional 
ambition, itself born of a wider cultural confusion about the status of the 
professional and the nature of his or her labor: 
  
 If the professional suffers from contradictory class locations — neither in 
 the capitalist nor the laborer's camps and yet both a (mental) capitalist 
 and an (intellectual) laborer — then he is also subject to ambiguous [...] 
 temporalities — neither born a professional, as the gentry is born gentry, 
 nor self-made, like the Smilesian businessman, and yet both born (with
  certain aptitudes) and made (through mental effort). With a 
 simultaneously pregnant and collapsed relationship to time, the 
 professional putatively boasts mental "gifts" that anticipate his future 
 (pregnant) but he simply becomes what he was always meant to be 
 (collapsed).21  
  
Such paradoxes mean that Miriam is continually subject to confounding 
judgments. Early in the novel, Miriam solicits the professional opinion of 
Madame Carré, a renowned French actress who has retired from the stage and 
now gives lessons. A range of major and minor characters witness Miriam's 
audition, and are also eager to assess if she has what one of them, Peter 
Sherringham, thinks of as the "mark of a vocation" (93). Significantly, however, 
the audition is framed less a test of Miriam's acting talent than of her general 
intelligence; Madame Carré asserts that if an actress has intelligence "she has 
every gift" (87). Miriam's intelligence test/acting audition is premised upon the 
idea that her ability can be objectively quantified: Madame Carré seeks to "count 
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[...]" Miriam's "properties" in order to "measure" her "histrionic nature" (93). 
Perhaps predictably, however, her judgments about intelligence and its relation 
to acting talent are at once peremptory and incoherent. On the one hand, she 
dismisses the idea that acting ability is a matter of "education"; when Miriam's 
mother brags that her daughter can speak many languages, Madame Carré 
retorts that Miriam ought then to be a governess — "there is no education that 
matters" (86). Yet she is equally disdainful of the idea of "natural endowments" 
(94), and claims that real acting ability is a matter of "unremitting and ferocious 
work" (94); she prizes "the effects the actor had worked hard for, had dug out of 
the mine by unwearied study" (93). In the context, this is a bewildering position. 
The purpose of Madame Carré passing judgment on Miriam is that her long 
experience should give her an eye for spotting potential; if Miriam already 
possessed the sedimented knowledge of "unwearied study" — the achievement of 
a long career as an actress — she would not need to submit herself to Madame 
Carré's examination. In effect, Miriam is judged "stupid" because she does not 
yet possess the practical experience she is trying to prove her capacity to acquire. 
However, no less than Miriam, Madame Carré is caught in a bind produced by 
tensions that inhere in the ideal of the professional. As a venerable expert, 
Madame Carré predictably values accumulated experience over the idea of 
natural gifts; but her expertise is being called upon to adjudicate on the question 
of whether Miriam has natural gifts, or at least whether she has latent capacity 
to acquire the same type of expertise. She cannot declare that Miriam simply has 
"talent" without undercutting the authority by which she makes the statement.22 
James encourages us to perceive that the verdicts about Miriam's mental 
capacity are sieved through an array of prejudices. First, he opens up the 
possibility that Miriam is merely suffering from stage-fright, both in relation to 
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the acting audition/intelligence test and in relation to the complex theatricality 
of the upper-class social milieu she is trying to negotiate. Certainly Nick 
responds to Miriam's audition as a spectacle of class sadism: he grows distressed 
watching "a poor working-girl's struggle with timidity" (86). Yet the other 
characters persistently find Miriam "crude" (92, 110, 128), "vulgar" (129, 146, 
147), and "coarse" (94, 127, 150). Her alleged "stupidity" is clearly at least in part 
a judgment about the spectacle of a déclassé woman whose need to establish a 
career makes her appear gratingly self-assertive to many of the novel's upper-
class characters, despite the fact that several of them are also professionals. 
Later in the novel, Nash reflects that it was Miriam's ambition that initially 
made her appear stupid to him: she was so "hungry to adopt an overrated 
profession that he had not imputed to her the normal measure of intelligence" 
(259). Similarly, it is later clarified that Peter's perception that Miriam is stupid 
is partly produced by his suspicion that the acting profession demands a "vulgar 
[...] conscience" (147). In a play upon the word "acting" typical of the novel, 
however, James also highlights that Peter's prejudice is not actually specific to 
the acting profession, but is an aristocratic distaste for all professions, all 
"acting" or doing in the world: Peter reflects that any effort to convert ideas into 
action is necessarily a "vulgarisation" of the self (147). 
Madame Carré low opinion of Miriam's talent is explicitly a Gallic disdain 
for the English character, which she regards as too obsessed with 
"respectability" to be compatible with the artistic life (89). This judgment is also 
confusing, since the novel's English characters generally fail to recognize Miriam 
as English; by them, she is classified as a cosmopolitan Jew, though the novel 
repeatedly specifies that she is only part-Jewish and we later learn that she 
considers herself English, or at least that her mother considers her so (135).23 It 
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is Miriam's Jewish ancestry that first leads Peter to suspect that she may in fact 
be "clever". Prior to having met her, he challenges Gabriel's assertion that she is 
stupid on the grounds that Jews are known to be of superior intelligence; Peter 
remarks that if Miriam turns out to be stupid, she will be the first known Jewish 
case (49).24 While other characters' judgments about Miriam's mental capacity 
are often issued with dogmatic certitude, the fact that the subject provokes so 
much fascinated speculation, and is analyzed through a bewildering 
kaleidoscope of clichés and stereotypes, paradoxically serves to render it 
enigmatic and posit it as that which standard frames of social judgment are 
inadequate to capture. Moreover, the fact that other characters are assessing 
Miriam's intelligence by assessing her acting ability underscores the extent to 
which they conceptualize intelligence as a form of theatrical display. 
 In her study of the rise of examination culture in nineteenth century 
Britain, Shuman emphasizes the theatrical dimensions of the examination scene, 
its "sense of disaster and drama".25 Yet Shuman suggests the underlying 
assumptions of nineteenth century exam are aligned not with the theatre but 
with novelistic realism. The exam and the realistic novel both claim to fathom 
depths and to make interior worth available for fair evaluation.26 It is often 
observed that James's fiction foregrounds the theatricality of everyday life, and, 
as one might expect, this is especially true of The Tragic Muse, his novel about 
the theatre.27 More surprising is how the novel highlights the extent to which 
modern social life has the quality of a formal examination; or, more precisely, 
that it combines theatricality with the exam's promise to make interior worth 
justly assessable. The novel's imaginative conflation of the stage and the exam is 
clarified through the minor character of Basil Dashwood, an actor and ultimately 
Miriam's husband. Basil is said to have "gone on the stage" because he "tried for 
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the diplomatic service" but failed to "dazzle his examiners" (111). In this, Basil 
stands in chiastic relation to Peter, the rival for Miriam's hand, who is said to 
have been highly successful in the same civil service exam but who is also a 
theatre aficionado (66). Throughout the novel, we are encouraged to perceive an 
underlying equivalence between the theatre and the diplomatic service, and 
Basil's and Peter's contrasting experiences of the civil service exam and 
subsequent career paths highlight the nexus between acting ability and the 
performance of class identity. James keeps the social origins of Basil obscure; 
other characters question both his intelligence and his status as a gentleman 
(211, 215, 307), though it is not clear if this is simply another manifestation of 
prejudice against the theatre. By contrast, James emphasizes that Peter 
performed brilliantly in the civil service exam because there were "flattering 
prejudices in his favor" (66); the exam tested not his intellectual abilities but his 
class privileges and the aura of natural authority that they conferred upon him. 
From 1870, the civil service had recruited through open, competitive 
examinations — a reform that was widely touted as the displacement of an 
ancient culture of patronage and the enshrinement of a modern principle of 
merit. However, as James' characterization of Peter's exam experience registers, 
meritocratic recruitment overwhelmingly favored young men from the ancient 
public schools and universities — institutions which continued to instill an 
aristocratic ethos despite the fact that they been infiltrated by the middle-classes 
by the late nineteenth century.28 As Asa Briggs observes, the civil service exam 
was intended to test not simply ability but the "character" and "social rank of the 
candidate", and thereby ensure that he had been "brought into contact with 
influences conducive to the sentiments of a gentleman".29 Here as throughout 
the novel, James emphasizes the extent to which a courtly ideal of sprezzatura 
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— that is, the courtier's obligation to maintain a mask of nonchalance and 
convey effortless superiority — haunts apparently modern ideals of merit and 
intelligence.30 
The one important exchange between Basil and Peter blurs the 
distinctions between theatrical technique and social performance. More 
important for my purposes, it highlights how the association of intelligence with 
aristocratic ideals of cultivated nonchalance and inscrutability has the effect of 
blurring the distinction between displaying cleverness and acting dumb:  
                                                     
"Ars celare artem", Basil Dashwood jocosely dropped. 
"You must first have the art to hide", said Sherringham, wondering a little 
why Miriam didn't introduce her young friend to him [...] 
"If you haven't any art it's not quite the same as if you didn't hide it, is it?" 
Basil Dashwood ingeniously threw out. 
"That's right — say one of your clever things!" Miriam sweetly responded. 
"You're always acting", he declared in English and with a simple-minded 
laugh, while Sherringham remained struck with his expressing just what he 
himself had felt weeks before. (218-219) 
 
The classical maxim ars celare artem — it is art to conceal art; or, true 
art conceals its artfulness — is often identified with the courtly ideal of 
sprezzatura.31 It is also the key paradox that undermines the distinction 
between cleverness and stupidity in The Tragic Muse. As Avital Ronnell 
observes, James tends to equate intelligence with reserve and with the capacity 
for concealment: "unreserved, stupidity exposes while intelligence hides".32 In 
other words, intelligence tends to manifest itself as an absence or as something 
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that is only faintly perceptible — "subtlety" — and the comedy of The Tragic 
Muse often hinges on the paradoxes produced by this logic. As the dizzying 
exchange between Basil and Peter dramatizes, cleverness which conceals itself is 
always at risk of being read as stupidity; any artfulness that succeeds too well is 
in danger of seeming like artlessness. Basil's response to Miriam, "you're always 
acting", implies that he thinks that her remark  — "say one of your clever 
things!" — is in fact insincere; she is playing the ingenue, and implying that Basil 
is a fool. Peter certainly seems to consider Basil a fool — the impression that 
Basil's laugh is "simple-minded" is apparently focalized through Peter — but the 
passage opens up the possibility that this is only Peter's obtuseness, or at least a 
sign of his exclusion; Basil's and Miriam's interchanges have so many tiers of 
paradoxical acting-clever-by-playing dumb that that their real relationship is 
opaque to Peter (though perhaps not to the reader, who suspects that the play of 
irony between them discloses their deepening intimacy).  
Miriam apparently succeeds as an actress because she masters the art-
conceals-art paradox: Nick observes of her that she becomes the "performer who 
could even produce the impression of not performing" (265). By the second book 
of the novel, she seems to others to be "always acting" (126, 218); like the 
courtier who has perfected sprezzatura, she has disappeared into her mask. Yet 
the ironic effect of her becoming a successful actress is the apparently 
widespread perception that she is not an actress at all; that her "profession" 
entails no technique or mental labor but is simply her natural way of being in the 
world, or a matter of feminine instinct. For instance, Gabriel rhapsodizes: 
"you've stopped acting, you've reduced it to the least that will do, you simply are 
— you're just the visible image, the picture on the wall" (269). Peter meanwhile 
seeks to demystify Miriam's acting ability in Darwinian terms. Echoing Darwin 
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in The Descent of Man (1871), Peter reflects that women's intelligence is 
essentially intuitive and imitative, akin to the intelligence of "lower races" and 
inferior to the rational capacities more typically found in European men:33  
 
She had her ideas, or rather she had her instincts, which she defended 
and illustrated, with a vividness superior to argument, by a happy 
pictorial phrase or a snatch of mimicry; [...] she liked experiments and 
caught at them, and she was especially thankful when some one gave her 
a showy reason, a plausible formula, in a case where she only stood on an 
intuition. She pretended to despise reasons and to like and dislike at her 
sovereign pleasure; but she always honoured the exotic gift, [...] as if she 
had been a naked islander rejoicing in a present of crimson cloth. (315) 
 
 We are meant to recognize the compensatory structure of this colonial 
fantasy. James often implies that Peter's boorishness as a suitor — inseparable 
from his faith in his mental superiority and in the potency of his class privileges 
— means he is not much good as a diplomat, either. Peter lacks the finesse to 
conceal his will to mastery in his courtship of Miriam; he plainly imagines it as a 
civilizing mission of an exotic primitive. The extended joke of this thread of the 
narrative is that Peter is a bad lover and a bad diplomat because, despite his 
fascination with the theatre, he is a bad actor: his attempts at romantic 
diplomacy read all too transparently as acts of imperialism. As John Carlos 
Rowe has pointed out, Miriam proves herself sharply aware of the psychological 
link between Peter's efforts to woo her by treating her to an aesthetic education 
and his professional commitment to British imperial ambitions.34 Later, seeking 
to convince Miriam to give up the stage in order to become an ambassador's 
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wife, Peter announces: "I shall be a great diplomatist [...] I'm infinitely cleverer 
than you have the least idea of, and you shall be a great diplomat's wife" (385). 
When this ludicrously undiplomatic speech fails to persuade Miriam, he leaves 
Europe for an undistinguished diplomatic post in an unspecified "little hot hole" 
in Central America.   
 
II Hereditary Eminence 
 
As has been suggested, Nick's narrative is the mirror inverse of Miriam's: he is 
assumed to be "clever" by virtue of his gender and class, and he comes to find his 
reputation for cleverness oppressive. On the most obvious level, this is because 
he associates it with the pressure to follow his father into politics when he would 
rather be an artist. However, the deeper logic of his narrative is that Nick has 
internalized modern, meritocratic ideals, and so recoils in disgust from the 
advantages conferred by his aristocratic status. Although Nick obviously has to 
win his seat as a Liberal member of parliament by campaigning, James 
emphasizes that the process is only superficially democratic: Nick really takes 
his seat by hereditary privilege and through a network of patronage, and this 
sours his faith in the Liberal cause and democracy in general.35 His reputation 
for a general, innate "cleverness" engenders self-contempt, as well as contempt 
for others — "ah the idiotic clever! if he was clever, what fools other people 
were!" (198).  
 The insistence with which other characters refer to Nick as "wonderfully 
clever" (155) or "immensely clever" (101) comes to register as glib and 
hyperbolic, and often has a clearly coercive dimension. For instance, Nick 
expresses qualms about marrying his patron, Lady Julia Dallow, to another of 
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his patrons, Mr. Carteret, on the grounds that Julia "thinks me cleverer than I 
am". Mr. Carteret responds: "You must be as clever as we think you. If you don't 
prove so — !" (194). The ambiguity of Mr. Carteret's statement — is it a 
declarative or an imperative? a reassurance or a threat? — epitomizes how 
judgments about intelligence in the novel often manage to be both dogmatic and 
unstable. On the one hand, Mr. Carteret takes Nick's cleverness for granted 
because Nick is the son of an aristocratic politician; it requires no proof because 
it is a matter of heredity and upper class enculturation. And yet the same logic 
that makes Nick's "cleverness" self-evident also renders it apocryphal: Mr. 
Carteret casts doubt on it in the very act of conferring it by fiat. Put another way, 
Mr. Carteret's statement typifies the unstable performativity of judgments about 
intelligence in this novel: Nick's 'cleverness' is not fixed attribute of his that 
others acknowledge and which qualifies him for professional life so much as a 
reality that others conjure into being.36 The novel's tendency to compare all 
professions to the theatre heightens our perception of the performativity of 
intelligence and professional merit: like Miriam's status as a 'stupid' actress, 
Nick's status as a 'clever young man' registers as a stock role, a conventional 
form of make-believe that must be continually sustained by himself and others.37 
Mr. Carteret's 'you must be as clever as we think you' simultaneously highlights 
the extent to which the attribution of talent is a financial speculation; Nick has 
to "live up" to his aristocratic "essence" — to borrow Pierre Bourdieu's phrase — 
and thereby make good on other people's investment in his being what they 
speculated he was.38 Nick's acute anxieties are produced partly by his 
recognition that his being called clever is not really a "compliment", because it is 
not freely bestowed; it is a form of credit or patronage that places him in the 
humiliating position of debtor or client.39 
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Hereditary talent in the novel is not simply an old aristocratic ideal; the 
phrase had acquired a quasi-scientific freight by the late nineteenth century. It 
evokes Galton's claims for the fundamentally hereditary nature of mental ability 
in Hereditary Genius. Galton's book received considerable attention in the 
popular press upon its first publication, though it met with hostility as well as 
more measured scepticism at the hands of reviewers.40 On the other hand, it was 
granted legitimacy by notable members of the scientific community: it was 
favorably reviewed by Alfred Russel Wallace, for example.41 Crucially, Galton 
also appears to have changed Darwin's mind about intelligence. Prior to reading 
Hereditary Genius, Darwin seems to have had a liberal, mid-Victorian faith in 
the rough equality of human capacity and in the gospel of work. Afterwards, 
however, Darwin wrote to his cousin: "You have made a convert of an opponent 
in one sense, for I have always maintained that, excepting fools, men did not 
differ much in intellect, only in zeal and hard work".42 Galton's riposte to this 
alchemizes the phenomenon of labor into proof of biological destiny: "Character, 
including the aptitude for hard work, is heritable like every other faculty".43 In 
the Descent of Man, Darwin treats Galton's theory of intelligence as established 
science: "we now know, through the admirable labors of Mr. Galton, that genius 
tends to be inherited".44 
 Galton's assimilation of hard work into the category of fixed biological 
inheritance captures the logic of his larger work on mental ability. Galton sought 
to prove the hereditary nature of intelligence by charting the genealogies of what 
he termed "eminent men" and generating statistics from that data. The validity 
of his data and his claims depended upon the premise that Britain was in the 
1860s and always had been essentially, if imperfectly, meritocratic: "social 
hindrances cannot impede men of high ability from becoming eminent".45 More 
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startlingly, he acknowledges that his effort to quantify intelligence depends upon 
the validity of his extending the logic of a metaphor: that of the examination. 
Galton's theory of intelligence rested on the plausibility of interpreting all of 
British history as a competitive, public exam after the pattern of the exam that 
really possessed his imagination, the mathematics tripos at the University of 
Cambridge:46 
 
High reputation is a pretty accurate test of high ability [...] I look upon 
social and professional life as a continuous examination. All are candidates 
for the good opinions of others, and for success in their several professions, 
and they achieve success in proportion as the general estimate is large of 
their aggregate merits. In ordinary scholastic examinations marks are 
allotted in stated proportions to various specified subjects [...] The world, 
in the same way, but almost unconsciously, allots marks to men [...] The 
metaphor of an examination may be stretched much further. As there are 
alternative groups in any one of which a candidate may obtain honours, so 
it is with reputations. (2, 6-7) 
 
 The metaphor of the exam expands imperiously in Galton's work. He 
loses sight of the fact that is a metaphor, and become absorbed in 
mathematizing reputation — "eminence" — and then proclaiming that the 
results disclose the truth of biological essence. Moreover, because Galton 
conceptualized intelligence as a unitary, biological trait he treated all vocations 
as if they were commensurable; in Hereditary Genius, the accomplishments of 
"statesmen", "literary men", "men of science" and "divines" are tabulated as 
manifestations of a single underlying phenomenon, natural ability. In this way, 
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Galton divested artistic genius of its quasi-mystical, Romantic status. The rise of 
such a model of intelligence in the late nineteenth century helps to account for 
the tendency of the characters in A Tragic Muse to discuss various vocations and 
forms of creativity — literature, painting, sculpture, acting, politics, diplomacy — 
as if they were all reducible to the same standard, "cleverness". 
 In an early scene of The Tragic Muse set in the sculpture floor of the Paris 
Salon, the annual exhibition of contemporary art, Nick discusses the nature of 
artistic talent with his sister Biddy, who is an aspiring sculptor. Nick and Biddy 
both appear certain that it is a matter of innate mental ability, but their dialogue 
reveals a shared, underlying confusion about the relationship between latent 
capacity and effort, being and doing: 
 
 "Don't you think I've any capacity for ideas?" the girl continued ruefully. 
 "Lots of them, no doubt. But the capacity for applying them, for putting 
 them into practice, how much of that do you have?" 
 "How can I tell until I try?" 
 "What do you mean by trying, Biddy dear?" 
 "Why you know — you've seen me". 
 "Do you call that trying?" her brother amusedly demanded. (25) 
 
On the one hand Biddy protests that the question of her talent remains 
open because has not yet tried in earnest to become an artist; on the other, she 
suggests that her brother should be able to judge if she has "capacity" by having 
"seen" her, but it is not clear if she means that he has seen her "try", or that he 
might be able to judge the quality of her "ideas" simply by judging how she 
looks. Nick picks up on this ambiguity and makes a joke of it — he both implies 
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she has not tried in earnest and that she is taxing him with judging her talent by 
her physical appearance. This minor joke establishes the tendency of novel's 
characters to render absolute judgments about mental worth on the basis of 
outward appearance, and introduces one of the novel's key themes. The notion 
that a person's mental qualities can be read off his or her physical characteristics 
recurred in various forms in the nineteenth century: it was axiomatic to the 
pseudo-sciences of physiognomy, craniometry, and phrenology, as well as to 
Galton's anthropometric tests. As this scene suggests, The Tragic Muse is 
particularly attentive to how judgments about mental ability are often entangled 
with the mystifying discourses of aesthetic judgment. For instance, Biddy is 
convinced of Nick's mental superiority because he is able to make aesthetic 
judgments more quickly and authoritatively than she can: 
 
His certainty of eye impressed her, and she felt what a difference there was 
yet between them — how much longer in every case she would have taken 
to discriminate. She was aware of how little she could judge of the value of 
a thing till she had looked at it ten minutes; indeed, modest little Biddy was 
compelled privately to add, "And often not even then" [...] She was 
mystified — Nick was often mystifying — but one thing was definite: her 
brother had high ability. It was the consciousness of this that made her 
bring out at last: "I don't much care whether or not I please mamma, if I 
please you". 
"Oh don't lean on me. I'm a wretched broken reed — I'm no use really!" he 
promptly admonished her. 




"A great talent — what's simpler than that?" [Biddy asked]. 
"One excellent thing, dear Biddy: no talent at all". 
"Well, yours is so real you can't help it". 
"We shall see, we shall see", said Nick. (26) 
 
 Tellingly, Biddy's suggestion that her brother's "talent" is a self-evident 
reality prior to any specific achievement and apparently floating free of any 
particular skill or vocation — it is hard to discern if the pair are discussing Nick's 
prospects as painter, or his prospects as a young man of general "high ability" — 
here induces one of Nick's characteristic paroxysms of self-loathing. Biddy's 
faith in her brother's "high ability" turns out to be far more precarious than it 
first seems; he only has to articulate self-doubt for her to be alarmed by the 
possibility that he is in fact a "duffer". Biddy simply takes her brother at his own 
estimation: when he condescends to her, she attributes "high ability" to him; 
when he disparages himself, her faith in him wavers too. There is also a more 
interesting instability here. The siblings offer contrasting but equally categorical 
judgments about each other's innate mental capacities; but ironically, both Nick 
and Biddy suspend judgment and invoke the criteria of time and effort when 
assessing themselves.  
 Nick's bildung entails his effort to escape the paralyzing effects of a 
reified, hereditarian conception of his own intelligence and to embrace an ideal 
of creative labor. At certain points James encourages us to read Nick's 
renunciation of his political career for the sake of art as an act of sublime 
masochism, the choice of a noble ascetic vocation over worldly success. 
However, James deprives Nick's choice of any obvious grandeur in that the 
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novel never clarifies whether Nick's paintings are any good. It remains pointedly 
agnostic on the question, but suggests that Nick might in fact be a mediocrity, 
precisely because other people are too ready to pronounce his work "clever". If 
there is dignity in Nick's choice, we are encouraged to feel that it is because he 
exposes himself to the risk of humiliation and failure:  
 
There were moments when he felt almost angry, [...] when by the few 
persons who saw [the paintings] they were pronounced wonderfully clever. 
That they were wonderfully clever was just the detestable thing in them, so 
active had that cleverness been in making them seem better than they were 
[...] he thought he saw as in an ugly revelation that nature had cursed him 
with an odious facility and that the lesson of his life, the sternest and 
wholesomest, would be to keep out of the trap it had laid for him [...] He 
was at all events too clever by half, since this pernicious overflow had 
wrecked most of his attempts [...] (450) 
 
Nick's "cleverness" is here posited as a fact of nature akin to a sexual 
impulse that must be sublimated for the sake of moral decency. Freedman notes 
that Nick's adoption of an artistic career is constructed as an "acceptance of the 
professional work ethic" (186), but this implies that the prevailing late 
nineteenth-century model of professionalism enshrined simply an ideal of 
virtuous slog, when in fact it tended to posit the professional as a mysterious 
interaction of latent ability and accumulated expertise.47 Nick is always insisting 
that his desire to be an artist is perverse: he wants to be one because he thinks 
he has "no talent" at it (182), and it will therefore entail a properly radical form 
of self-mortification. This logic is framed partly in terms of the novel's pervasive 
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"rhetoric of testing":48  
The greatest time to do one's work was when it didn't seem worth doing, 
for then one gave it a brilliant chance, that of resisting the stiffest test of all 
— the test of striking one as too bad. To do the most when there would be 
the least to be got by it was to be most in the spirit of high production [...] 
Art was doing — it came back to that — which politics in most cases 
weren't" (393).  
This representation of art as strenuous, ascetic doing calls to mind James 
Eli Adam's claim that the professionalization of literature in the Victorian period 
often prompted male writers to represent their own writing as a form of heroic 
self-discipline compatible with normative ideals of masculinity.49 Yet it seems 
extremely difficult to read Nick's vision of art as a form of masochistic doing as a 
self-legitimating gesture on James's part; if it is, it is an extraordinarily oblique 
one. Nick forfeits not just the idea of worldly success, but any compensatory 
Romantic ideal of the artist as suffering genius; he labors on not just in spite but 
because of the possibility that has no talent. Nick embraces art because it grants 
him the opportunity to feel stupid, and as if he were condemned to a life of 
obscure, futile toil: he affirms "I must go and sit down in a corner and learn my 
alphabet" (398); and at the end of the novel, he fantasizes not about success but 
of " an eternity of grinding" (463). "Doing" art is simultaneously Nick's effort to 
escape what he experiences as the burden of hereditary intelligence. Nick half-
facetiously tells Gabriel that he wants to be an artist in spite of the fact that it 
means divesting himself of hereditary advantage: he has checked his genealogy 
carefully, and found no examples of artistic "eminence" (122). It is telling that 
Nick uses Galton's favored term, "eminence", in this context, since it is the 
Galtonian model of hereditary eminence that haunts Nick and which makes the 
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artistic vocation seem to him an emancipation from "family, [...] blood, [...] 
heredity, [...] traditions" (122).  
 
III. The Art of Getting Your Experience Fast 
 
Thus far I have emphasized that Nick associates "cleverness" with his own class 
origins and with an aristocratic valorization of being over doing. However, the 
term "clever" also acquires a range of contrary connotations in the novel: it is 
associated with commercialism, publicity, and the temporality of modernity. As 
Ronnell observes, intelligence is often measured by a "technostandard": we 
assume that it is aligned with "quick-wittedness, speed of comprehension — in 
general, with the high velocity of mind of our modernity. The mind capable of 
quick comprehension may be a calculative mind, agile in performing mechanical 
operations that, however, are not interiorized or broken but smooth and 
unproblematic in terms of the results they yield".50 It is frequently suggested 
that both Miriam's "genius" and Nick's "cleverness" consist of a capacity for 
rapid assimilation that thwarts their development of deep, private interiority — 
the traditional telos of the bildungsroman form — and makes them exploitable 
as slick commodities. (Both characters are extensively "stage-managed" by a 
range of patrons, mentors, and family members, and their degree of agency in 
their own careers is always questionable.) In the tradition of the bildungsroman, 
"intelligence", "genius", or "talent" is often the characteristic that justifies a 
protagonist's status as an exemplary hero or heroine and is associated with his 
or her capacity to cultivate an especially rich inner life.51 Yet in The Tragic Muse, 
the mental capacities of the two key protagonists are in apparent tension with 
the humanistic assumptions of the ideal of bildung: in the cases of both Nick 
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and Miriam, the attribute of "cleverness" threatens to empty out any kind of 
private inner life or sense of meaningful vocation. Nick's "talent for appearance", 
his "damnable suppleness" and "gift of immediate response" propel him to 
electoral success in age of expanding democracy, despite his utter lack of 
conviction and patrician disdain for his constituency (450). This is another 
source of Nick's self-contempt: he regards the political system as "humbuggery, 
hypocrisy and cant" (255) precisely because he manages to "get on fast" in it 
(399). The novel is structured to highlight the parallels between democratic 
politics and the theatre, and like Miriam's success on the stage, Nick's electoral 
victory entails "becom[ing] a spectacle to the vulgar" (169). Similarly, James 
often prompts us to wonder if Miriam's much-touted "genius" is really an 
aptitude for self-commodification. Other characters suggest that Miriam 
succeeds because she is a chameleon without any underlying character or 
substance, and is therefore a fitting muse for a shallow, distracted modernity. 
Peter reflects of Miriam: "to hear her you might have thought there was no 
cleverness anywhere but in her own splendid impatience" (314); he later 
remarks of her, "she learned so fast [...] Genius is only the art of getting your 
experience fast" (311). Like Nick, Miriam suspects that her success is 
meretricious and worries that it will undermine her capacity to take herself 
seriously as an artist (466). Although Miriam eventually triumphs in the role of 
Juliet, there is the repeated suggestion that she is essentially preoccupied with 
managing her celebrity and is more truly suited to "do[ing]" comic roles (314); 
she regards the "art of comedian" as the "most distinguished thing in the world" 
(232). This gives a bitterly ironic flavor to James's choice of title: James implies 
in an "age of publicity" (346), the idea of tragedy is an anachronism, or is at least 
likely to be eclipsed by "the Comic Muse" (363); there is little patience for high 
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seriousness and no real nobility in suffering. "You can't suffer for art", Peter 
observes to Nick at one point. "That grand romance is over" (397). 
This brings us to Wilde's place in the novel. The fact that the word 
"cleverness" in this novel does duty for old aristocratic ideals, on the one hand, 
and modern forms of self-commodification, on the other, has an intelligible logic 
when it is remembered that the personification of "cleverness" in this novel, 
Gabriel, is a thinly veiled Wilde. In a novel about artistic vocations, Gabriel is the 
only character with a decidedly literary bent: he is said to have written an "very 
clever" novel (31), but he claims to have renounced all literary ambition, and 
now appears to live as a kind of Socratic dandy who will only dispense his 
aphorisms in propria persona, as unscheduled, one-off performances. Like 
Wilde in the 1880s, Gabriel is essentially a professional talker: he lives to dazzle 
and provoke by his stream of perfectly turned phrases which at once draw 
attention to the theatricality of his own persona and, as Peter Brooks notes, the 
"staginess" of other characters.52 Shelley Salamensky has suggested that James's 
famous antipathy to Wilde can be traced in part to the fact that Wilde's repartee 
left him tongue-tied; James felt humiliated by one of Wilde's quips upon their 
first meeting, and thereafter distrusted Wilde's hyper-fluent talk, dismissing him 
as "fatuous fool, a tenth-rate cad".53 The fact that Gabriel is the only literary 
figure in this novel about the arts and even he has repudiated writing in favor of 
"clever" talk — talk which entrances some of the characters, but which is found 
"fatuous" (113) by others — seems to encode James's fear that Wilde's career 
adumbrated the fate of the modern writer: the reduction of literature to clever 
slogans and of the writer to an amusing but ultimately marginal personality. The 
fact that Nick's portrait of Gabriel seems to Nick to fade mysteriously has been 
read as a sign of Gabriel's queer elusiveness, his capacity to resist conventional 
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representation and float free of the determinants of identity;54 yet it may also be 
read in more pessimistic terms, as a symbol of the attenuation of the novelist in 
a debased, spectacle-driven culture. 
At the end of the novel, Miriam, the poor, supposedly "stupid" actress, is 
fêted as a genius; Nick, the "clever" aristocrat, has embraced art because it 
enables him to feel like a "poor clumsy beginner"(420) and to experience a kind 
of imaginary déclassement. The fact that James tells their vocation narratives 
according to two incommensurable representational logics — one realist, one 
theatrical — deprives us of stable grounds for interpreting these ironic reversals; 
we cannot examine Miriam and Nick by a common standard. James's refusal to 
arbitrate among the cacophony of judgments about Nick's and Miriam's mental 
worth and clarify if either of them have genuine talent for their chosen vocations 
underscores the novel's wider project of interrogating the complicity of aesthetic 
discourses, including the bildungsroman form, in facile and potentially 
oppressive measurements of intelligence and merit.55 In a novel in which most 
of the characters are in a rush to deliver summary judgments about the mental 
worth of others, it is a minor, apparently "stupid" character, Mrs. Rooth — 
Miriam's mother — who articulates the perplexity that the reader reasonably 
feels, and poses the question that we might wish to ask of James: 
 
 "Dear me, if he isn't clever you must tell us: we can't afford to be  
 deceived!" Mrs. Rooth innocently wailed. "What do we know — how can 
 we judge?" she appealed. 
 [Peter] had a pause, his hand on the latch. "Oh, I'll tell you frankly what 
 I think of him!" (211-212) 
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As so often in this novel, the question of intelligence is a financially 
interested one here: Mrs. Rooth cannot afford to be wrong in her speculations 
about it. Yet this is apparently trivial moment is also charged with much more 
complex implications. James prompts us to entertain the possibility that Mrs. 
Rooth is herself talented actress and not in fact the vacuous stage-mother she is 
generally taken for: she might be playing dumb in order to trap Peter into 
exposing his overweening faith in his own intellect and thereby ensure that 
Miriam marries Basil, the person whose intelligence is in doubt. One way of 
reading the novel is that Mrs. Rooth manages her daughter's career and love life 
with consummate artfulness. On this reading, Mrs. Rooth only appears to be a 
peripheral, dim-witted character; she is in fact the ingenious architect of a 
substantial part of the plot. James gives us no good grounds for judging whether 
her stupidity is in fact artful, except for the fact that Mrs. Rooth is usually "in the 
wings" of any scenes in which Miriam appears and that she gets what she 
appears to want. This epistemological wormhole is comic, a counter-narrative 
briefly opened up but not explored. It nonetheless reflects James's larger effort 
to keep the question of the intelligence of every character — even the apparently 
minor, foolish ones — in play.56  
James, rather than seeking to make the novel form an instrument for 
adjudicating differences in intelligence, uses it as a means of staging the 
incalculable complexities embedded in such judgments. Although The Tragic 
Muse finds comedy in the hypocrisies and confusions generated by the modern 
preoccupation with examining mental ability, in James's "major phase" novels, 
The Wings of the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl 
(1904), the moral stakes of not thinking anyone stupid — of sustaining a 
paranoid agnosticism about everyone's intelligence — are much higher. James's 
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interrogation of late nineteenth century constructions of intelligence in The 
Tragic Muse is primarily a critique of the idea that true art conceals art — that 
is, that it conceals mental labor and projects easeful "cleverness". At the end of 
novel, it is far from clear that Nick will be able to sustain his ideal of art as a 
form of ascetic labor which resists not only the temptations of the marketplace 
but the temptations of "cleverness": we learn that he has exhibited a "noble" 
portrait of his former patron, Lady Dallow, which perhaps indicates that his art 
has been co-opted by the political establishment he sought to escape (491). Yet 
Nick's earlier model of art as masochistic, impotent doing in the absence not 
only of hope for success but belief in his mental gifts is the novel's only gesture 
toward fulfilling the promise of "tragedy" held out in the title. 
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